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The Idealism and Pantheism of May Sinclair 
1 Introduction  
 May Sinclair (1863-1946) was a British novelist, feminist, and idealist philosopher. 
Although there is substantial scholarship on her fiction  and her feminism , there are no detailed 1 2
studies of her philosophy. This is unfortunate because Sinclair developed a unique kind of idealism, 
partially sourced in the work of realist Samuel Alexander. Sinclair takes on Alexander’s belief that 
we must ‘take time seriously’, and provides a rare idealist attempt to do just that. Her system 
illuminates the possibilities of idealism and pantheism, and offers a fresh perspective on 1920s 
interactions between British idealisms and realisms. This paper addresses the neglect of Sinclair’s 
philosophy by providing the first substantial enquiry into it. I explore Sinclair’s mature idealism and 
pantheism, found principally in her 1922 The New Idealism, and contextualise her work within its 
period. Sinclair’s philosophical views are intertwined with her fiction, and I gesture towards such 
links.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces Sinclair’s life and work, and situates 
her in early twentieth century British philosophy. As we will see, she became a ‘British idealist’ at a 
time when idealism was slowly dying out in Britain, superseded by ‘new realism’. Section 3 
excavates what I believe to be Sinclair’s core positive argument for idealism. She argues idealism 
can only survive if it takes on elements of realism, and she took on realist concern with the nature of 
time. However, against realism, Sinclair argues the only way to account for time is to involve 
consciousness. As Section 4 explains, Sinclair ultimately posits an Absolute consciousness, and 
identifies this Absolute with the universe. As she also identifies the Absolute with God, her system 
  Major studies include Boll (1973), Raitt (2000), Kunka & Troy (2011), Bowler (2016), and Bowler & Drewery 1
(2017).
 Recent scholarship includes Forster (2003), Pease (2006), and Gough (2009). 2
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is a kind of pantheism. Section 4 discusses Sinclair’s pantheism in detail, showing that space and 
time are necessary to creation, and exploring her unique account of omniscience. Section 5 
concludes. This study aims to open new paths for scholarship on Sinclair, for historians of 
philosophy as well as scholars of literature and feminism. 
2 Sinclair and Early Twentieth Century British Philosophy  
 Sinclair grew up near Liverpool, in a difficult family . She was largely educated at home but 3
in 1881 she was sent for a brief stay at Cheltenham Ladies’ College, where the headmistress 
Dorothea Beale encouraged her to read philosophy. Around this period Sinclair read historical 
works by Plato, Spinoza, Locke, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Kant; and contemporary works by 
British idealists such as T. H. Green and Edward Caird. Although Sinclair’s interest in philosophy 
continued, she did not pursue a professional career in academia.  
 Sinclair resolved to be a writer, and in 1897 published her first novel, Audrey Craven. 
Although this was fairly well received, it was her third, 1904 novel The Divine Fire that brought 
Sinclair wealth and success. This book became a bestseller in America. The writer Ford Maddox 
Ford wrote that, in the States, ‘Parties were given at which examinations were held as to the 
speeches of the characters in Miss Sinclair’s book’. Sinclair travelled around America, meeting the 
likes of Ralph Waldo Emerson and William James, and going motoring with President Theodore 
Roosevelt . She became friends with H. G. Wells, W. B. Yeats and Thomas Hardy. Sinclair’s work 4
especially impressed T. S. Eliot, another writer with a deep interest in British idealism . Over the 5
course of her career she published twenty-one novels, many volumes of short stories and poetry, 
and works of literary criticism. During World War I, Sinclair visited the Belgium front lines with an 
ambulance corps, and she published an account of it in 1915. In 1916 she was elected a fellow of 
 These and the following biographical details are taken from Boll (1973), Raitt (2000), and Saunders (2007). Sinclair 3
was born ‘Mary Amelia St. Clair’ and changed her name to May later.
 On this and other anecdotes see Raitt (2000, 95-6). 4
 See Neff (1980).5
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the Royal Society of Literature. Towards the end of her life Sinclair became ill, and wrote nothing 
after 1927.  
 Although Sinclair is best known as a novelist, she was also a philosopher. Her work 
emerged during a tumultuous period of British philosophy. In the late nineteenth century, British 
philosophy was dominated by a movement known as ‘Absolute idealism’. This view, heavily 
sourced in Kant and Hegel, held that the universe is a single Absolute consciousness. As the 
Absolute is singular and partless, Absolute idealism provides a kind of ‘existence monism’: in 
reality, only one thing exists. Ultimate reality is the Absolute, and all else is appearance. British 
Absolute idealists included William Wallace, Edward Caird, T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, and F. 
H. Bradley. Of their works, Bradley’s 1893 Appearance and Reality is the best known today.  
 Around the turn of the twentieth century, challenges emerged to Absolute idealism. One 
challenge was new forms of idealism. Concerned that Absolute idealism does not allow for the 
individuality of persons or selves, ‘personal idealists’ such as Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison and H. 
G. Sturt argued that reality is pluralist: it is composed of many minds. For at least Pringle-Pattison 
(1887, 216) this plurality ultimately forms a unified Absolute, on which persons are ‘parts of the 
system of things’ . Other idealists argued for more thoroughgoing forms of pluralisms. Idealist 6
‘monadologists’ - including James Ward, J. M. E McTaggart and Hilda Oakeley - grounded their 
system in Leibniz’s Monadology . They held the universe comprises a plurality of unique, 7
independent monads or persons.  
 Another challenge to Absolute idealism was the rejection of idealism altogether. The ‘new 
realists’ included Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, A. N. Whitehead, John Laird, Susan Stebbing, and 
Samuel Alexander. New realism was characterised by the pluralist view that many things exist, and 
relations hold between them, and by appeals to science and mathematical logic. Groundbreaking 
 On personal idealism, see Cunningham (1933), Passmore (1957), Mander (2011), and Dunham, Grant and Watson 6
(2011).
 On Ward and McTaggart, see Mander (2011); on Oakeley, see Thomas (2015). 7
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realist texts included Moore’s 1899 “The Nature of Judgment” and Russell’s 1903 The Principles of 
Mathematics. 
  Realism quickly gained ground and, by the 1910s, idealism of all kinds was on the back 
foot. It didn’t help that major idealist stalwarts were passing away. Many first wave idealists, 
including Green, had passed away by the turn of the twentieth century. Of the second wave, 
Bosanquet and Bradley passed away in 1923 and 1924 respectively. Although idealism sputtered in 
the 1920s and 1930s, it was not snuffed out . Later idealists continued to publish and debate their 8
ideas, including Harold Joachim, J. H. Muirhead, J. S. Mackenzie, A. E. Taylor and Oakeley. This 
was the British philosophical scene Sinclair engaged with, and her work forms part of this late wave 
of British idealism.  
 Sinclair published philosophy throughout her career. After her stint at Cheltenham Ladies’ 
College, she authored several articles on Plato and Descartes for the Cheltenham Ladies’ College 
Magazine. She went on to publish philosophy journal articles, and defended the Women’s Suffrage 
League in a 1912 pamphlet Feminism . In her fifties, Sinclair authored two books of philosophy. 9
Sinclair’s 1917 A Defence of Idealism provides what it says on the tin. Her 1922 The New Idealism 
also defends idealism; in its opening pages Sinclair (1922, ix) explains that the book is an attempt 
‘to remedy the many shortcomings’ of her earlier Defence . Critical editions of both books are 10
forthcoming from the Edinburgh University Press. 
 Sinclair’s idealism leaks into her fiction, which is why her idealism is of interest to literary 
scholars. Gillespie (1978, 138) argues that Sinclair sees art and metaphysics as ‘inseparable’. Many 
of Sinclair’s characters are philosophers or artists, and they often explore philosophical ideas. For 
example, her first book Nakiketas and other Poems - published in 1886 under the pseudonym Julian 
Sinclair - has Death saying:  
 For a broader history of idealism’s ‘afterlife’ see Mander (2011, 526-56).8
 On Feminism, see Boll (1973, 251-3) and Raitt (2000, 104-13).9
 Sinclair (1922, ix) describes this earlier book as ‘light-hearted’, which does not do the dense and careful monograph 10
justice.
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Knowledge is Being…  
Man works, and from the clay of his own hands, 
Or dreams of his own soul, he shapes the gods (Sinclair, 1886, 12-13). 
As Raitt (2000, 36) observes, ‘Sinclair’s Death is an idealist’. Sinclair’s idealism is also explicit in 
her short story “Finding the Absolute”, discussed below. 
 Sinclair’s philosophy books were widely reviewed, although their reception was mixed. 
Reviewers consistently praised her dynamic style  and critiques of new realism, yet Sinclair’s 11
positive arguments for idealism were often unremarked or dismissed. To illustrate, let’s look at 
Russell’s two reviews of A Defence of Idealism. On the one hand, Russell (1917a, 590) describes it 
as ‘extremely interesting and full of good things’. On the other hand, Russell (1917b, 381) describes 
Sinclair as an ‘amateur’ philosopher, a breed of thinker that does not invent new systems but rather 
interprets existing ones for the general public . Russell began corresponding with Sinclair on 12
philosophy from 1917 onwards  and invited her to lunch on the day of his first lecture on 13
mathematical logic. Reportedly she promised ‘not to write on philosophy again’ until she had 
considered all the points he raised . Mary Whiton Calkins, another rare woman philosopher of the 14
period, is more appreciative of Sinclair’s philosophical value. Calkins (1919, 123) writes that any 
reader who takes up Sinclair’s Defence will discover ‘no simplified, superficial re-wording of other 
people’s conclusions but rather an independent and critical study of fundamental doctrines’. Laird 
(1922, 116) wrote of The New Idealism that it keeps up a ‘brisk bombardment’ of realism ‘with the 
most pertinacious freshness and pith’ but is unconvinced by her arguments. Russell (1922, 625-6) 
 For example, Harvey (1919, 554) describes Sinclair’s writing as ‘sparkling’: ‘there is no doubt that the manifestation 11
of the absolute in Miss Sinclair has a tremendously good time and dances ecstatically among the struggling philosophies 
like the fabled Irishman at the fair, looking for heads to hit’. Meanwhile, Calkins (1919, 127) describes Sinclair’s 
‘vivacity of style and phraseology’ as ‘wearisome’.
 Ray Monk, a Russell scholar, seems to agree. Monk (1996, 505) writes ‘it is at first glance difficult to see why 12
Russell took her book and her views so seriously’, and attributes this solely to Russell’s respect for Sinclair’s amateur 
status and engaging writing style.
 Some of their correspondence is extant in the Bertrand Russell archives, McMaster University. 13
 See Monk (1996, 506).14
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continued to stir condescension into his approbation of Sinclair’s second philosophy book, implying 
that its value lies in its writing style rather than its ‘actual contribution to the corpus of philosophy’. 
Russell does, however, allow that The New Idealism is ‘one of the best’ recent defences of idealism. 
Frustratingly, Laird and Russell do not engage with the arguments of The New Idealism in any 
depth. 
 In recognition of her work, Sinclair became a member of the Aristotelian Society in 1917. In 
a letter to Russell dated 14 November 1917, she writes that the Society would not previously allow 
her to become a member: ‘they said they would not have women in because you can’t knock them 
about’ . Sinclair served their Executive Committee between 1922 and 1926.  15
 Following an Aristotelian Society talk Sinclair gave in 1923, J. H. Muirhead invited her to 
contribute to his collection Contemporary British Philosophy. The volume aimed to provide 
‘picture’ of current British philosophy, featuring thinkers such as Broad, Bosanquet, Laird, 
McTaggart and Russell. In his invitation, Muirhead notes ‘there is no other woman writer on the 
list’ . Later, Sinclair’s interests in idealism led her to psychology and psychoanalysis. She joined 16
the Society for Psychical Research, which aimed to prove human survival after death through 
experimental means. She also became a founding member of Dr. Jessie Margaret Murray's Medico-
Psychological clinic . 17
 In one of the few philosophy encyclopaedia entries on Sinclair, Mander (2005, 956) 
observes that her views ‘never became widely known’ and ‘provoked little response’. This is at least 
partly because of their timing. Sinclair was advocating an idealist metaphysics at a time when 
idealism was slowly fading away. She was well aware of this:  
 Sinclair adds, ‘Now, I don’t mind being knocked about, in fact, I like it’. Bertrand Russell archives, McMaster 15
University, manuscript 80782 056107 5.46 RA1 710. Despite Sinclair’s remarks on this issue, it is worth noting there 
were earlier women members of the Aristotelian Society, such as Beatrice Edgell.
 See Boll (1973, 19). Ultimately, Sinclair didn’t contribute to the volume. 16
 On Sinclair’s psychological work, see Boll (1973, 256-60) and Raitt (2000, 109-44).17
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There is a certain embarrassment in coming forward with an Apology for Idealistic Monism at the 
present moment. You cannot be quite sure whether you are putting in an appearance too late or much 
too early. It does look like personal misfortune or perversity that, when there are lots of other 
philosophies to choose from, you should happen to hit on the one that has just had a tremendous 
innings and is now in process of being bowled out (Sinclair, 1917, vii).  
Sinclair’s philosophical work has also been neglected in the history of philosophy. She is not 
mentioned in many studies covering British idealism , or in studies of historical women 18
philosophers . Her philosophical views are occasionally touched on by literary scholars  and 19 20
historians of philosophy  yet there are no detailed studies of Sinclair’s philosophical system. 21
3 Sinclair’s Core Argument for Idealism  
 Sinclair is an Absolute idealist. ‘The world’, Sinclair (1922-23, 111) tells us, ‘arises in 
consciousness, through consciousness, and is of that stuff, with no independent existence apart from 
it’. The New Idealism advances many arguments in favour of idealism, including negative 
arguments comprising critiques of realism. Briefly, I’ll give a few examples of these negative 
arguments. 
 The material, pluralist world posited by realism is arguably closer to our everyday 
perceptions than the minded, monistic world of Absolute idealism. This seems to lend realism the 
following philosophic advantages: it is commonsensical, it need not distinguish between appearance 
and reality, and it does not require knotty metaphysics. As Sinclair (1922, 49) puts it, realism looks 
as if it is true. The great thing about her critiques is that they remove that veneer of truth-seeming. 
In fact, new realist systems are not commonsensical, they do distinguish between appearance and 
 Such as Cunningham (1933), Passmore (1957), Dunham, Grant and Watson (2011), or Boucher and Vincent (2012).18
 Such as Kersey (1989) or Warnock (1996).19
 Including Boll (1973), Gillespie (1978), Raitt (2000), Bowler (2016).20
 Sinclair’s idealism is briefly described in Mander’s British Idealism (2011, 531-2), and more substantially in Waithe’s 21
History of Woman Philosophers (1995, 315-320).
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reality, and their metaphysics is knotty. To illustrate, Sinclair (1922, 20) objects to Russell’s view 
that all we perceive is sense data, and sense data is all that exists. Sinclair argues this view entails 
‘we are perceiving different universes and there will be as many universes of sensible qualities as 
there are spectators’. Sinclair (1922,47-8) lambasts Laird’s realist theory of memory, on which 
remembering literally involves perceiving the past. What, she asks, can this theory say to the 
phenomenon of remembering a mountain and then imagining tearing it down? She argues a theory 
of memory on which we are not literally perceiving the mountain is preferable. Sinclair (1922, 198) 
also dissects Alexander’s account of mind-body emergence, pressing him on how, exactly, a new 
quality of mind can emerge from the existing quality of body. These worries are as sound today as 
they were a century ago.  
 All Sinclair’s arguments for idealism, positive and negative, deserve attention. However, for 
lack of space, this paper will focus on what I take to be her ‘core’ positive argument for idealism. 
Sinclair foreshadows the argument in the opening pages of The New Idealism: 
Realism is ten times more formidable than it was in 1917. 
And since 1917 the issue has been narrowed down to the field of Space and Time, and it is there that 
the battle between realism and idealism must be fought (Sinclair, 1922, vii). 
Realism and idealism will fight on the battleground of space and time. Later, she explains: 
What is required of metaphysics is… the solution of precisely such problems as the antimonies of 
Space and Time. I think you will not solve the contradictions of Space and Time… by leaving out 
ultimate mind. At any rate the experiment has been tried, and I think it has failed. 
It is idealism’s turn now (Sinclair, 1922, 222). 
!8
Sinclair argues that where realism has failed to explain the nature of space and time, idealism can. 
She assumes that realism and idealism are the only metaphysical theories on the table so, if she is 
correct, we have a strong reason to adopt idealism.  
 The core argument occurs towards the middle of The New Idealism, in a chapter titled 
“Space, Time and Consciousness”. As I reconstruct it, the argument has five premises and a 
conclusion. Although Sinclair discusses time and space, the bulk of the argument concerns time, so 
that is my focus: 
I We should prefer a metaphysics that can account for our perception of time 
II If taken by itself, time would be discontinuous 
III Yet we perceive time as continuous 
IV Realism cannot account for our perception of time as continuous  
V Idealism can account for our perception of time as continuous 
VI We should prefer an idealist metaphysics  
I will discuss each step of the argument in turn. 
 (I) is uncontroversial. Many metaphysical theories, including realism and idealism, seek to 
provide an account of reality that accounts for our perceptual experience. As time is a fundamental 
part of our perceptual experience, it is reasonable to prefer a metaphysics that can account for it.   
 (II) is a kind of thought experiment. Sinclair asks, If we could take time by itself, what 
would time be like? Her answer is that time would be discontinuous. She describes this in the 
following way: 
Time taken by itself, is utterly attenuated; so far from covering Space, it falls like a thin thread of 
rain, drop by drop, across that immensity and for ever… 
!9
Time can never hope to recover its own past or to grasp its own future. It knows nothing but the 
present, and the present is a vanishing point between a not-yet-existing future and a no-longer-
existing past. 
In the same way the body in motion lets go the past point-instant and has no grip of the future as 
such. It is at a point at an instant; at another point at another instant, as far as the elements of time, 
space and matter are concerned that is all that can be said about its motion. The change of point-
instants which is the essence of the affair remains a miracle (Sinclair, 1922, 224-5). 
This passage is difficult to understand; I read it as follows. I interpret Sinclair as describing a 
universe in which the present moment exists, and past and future moments do not. Today, this 
theory is known as ‘presentism’. In contrast, ‘eternalism’ holds that the past, present and future 
exist. These labels appear in the 1980s, so obviously early twentieth century philosophers do not 
use them. Nonetheless, Sinclair is describing a presentist universe: she claims the present is a 
‘vanishing point’ between a ‘not-yet-existing future’ and a ‘no-longer-existing past’.  
 I believe Sinclair has found a special problem of continuity for proponents of a presentist 
universe. This problem is pointed at in the final lines of the passage above, and concerns motion. To 
understand it, consider one of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, the ‘arrow paradox’. Above, we saw 
Sinclair claim that metaphysics should solve the ‘antimonies’ of space and time; this is one of the 
problems she has in mind.  
 Zeno’s arrow paradox is recorded in Aristotle:  
[Zeno] says that if everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in 
locomotion is always in a now, the flying arrow is therefore motionless…  
to the effect that the flying arrow is at rest, which result follows from the assumption that time is 
composed of moments (Aristotle Physics, 239b5-32). 
!10
A flying arrow seems to be motion. Yet Zeno argues that at any moment of the arrow’s flight, the 
arrow is ‘at rest’. Zeno assumes that time is composed of a plurality of moments, each of which 
depicts whatever is happening in space at that instant. On Figure 1, one moment is t1 and the next is 
t2, and so on. At each of these moments, the arrow hangs motionless at a different point in its flight, 
like stills in a vintage film. As the arrow’s flight is purely composed of such moments, Zeno 
concludes that at no point is the arrow in motion. Sinclair (1922, 139-40) puts it thus: ‘The arrow 
cannot fly, because going from next point-instant to next, it is stationary at each point at each 
instant’. The arrow paradox has grand consequences: if a flying arrow isn’t in motion, then nothing, 
anywhere in the universe, is in motion. Despite appearances, motion is impossible.   
 Huggett (2017) provides a comprehensive overview of Zeno’s paradoxes, and a solution to 
this one. Huggett writes the only answer to the arrow paradox is that the arrow moves from one 
place to another over time simply by occupying different points at different times: ‘the arrow never 
changes its position during an instant but only over intervals composed of instants’. The key point is 
that the arrow only changes its position over intervals composed of instants. In other words, change 
is only possible during multiple moments of time, not over a single moment. On Figure 1, there is 
no motion at t1. Nor is there motion at t2. There is only motion across t1 and t2. 
 You might think this poses a special problem for a presentist universe. On an eternalist 
universe, all moments of time exist simpliciter, so a multiplicity of moments co-exist through which 
the arrow flies. In contrast, on a presentist universe, only one moment of time exists simpliciter. 
!11
This means there is no multiplicity of co-existing moments through which an arrow flies. I read 
Sinclair as articulating this problem. She believes time by itself would be discontinuous, in the 
sense there is no multiplicity of moments through which things move. This is why she describes the 
motion of a body over time as a ‘miracle’.  
 Are there any sources for this view in Sinclair? As far as I am aware, these specific worries 
about continuity or presentism are not found in any other British idealists. Idealists such as Bradley 
and McTaggart famously reject the reality of time, yet there is no suggestion that Sinclair follows 
suit. Instead, she seems to be drawing on a new realist text about time: Alexander’s 1920 Space, 
Time, and Deity. Sinclair was hugely impressed by Alexander’s work and corresponded with him 
about realism and idealism . The opening pages of The New Idealism states: 22
I could have done nothing without Professor Alexander’s work on Space-Time. Much as idealism 
owes to idealists, its larger debt must be to the first realist who taught them to “take Space and Time 
seriously.” So, after years of devotion to Mr. Bradley’s Absolute, I wanted to see what would happen 
if I simply followed the trail which, thanks to Professor Alexander, I saw before me (Sinclair, 1922, 
x-xi). 
Alexander (1920i, 45) also argues that, if time were taken by itself, the moments of time would be 
discontinuous. Alexander claims that in this case ‘there could be no continuity’ in time, there would 
merely be a ‘now’ which was perpetually renewed. Time would ‘consist of perishing instants’ . 23
Alexander is also describing a presentist universe. However, unlike Sinclair, Alexander makes no 
 On 24 May 1922, Sinclair sent Alexander a copy of The New Idealism, along with a letter. The letter appears to be 22
part of a longer correspondence, and Sinclair writes that she is ‘greatly looking forward’ to meeting Alexander later that 
year in July - the implication is that they will be meeting for the first time. The letter also expresses Sinclair’s ‘immense 
admiration’ for the opponents she has so ‘rashly “gone for”’. The only other extant letter from what seems to be a much 
longer correspondence is dated 16 March 1926. This letter discusses art. Having stated she is an idealist, Sinclair adds 
that creative art is discovery, ‘but discovery in a mental world. I’m incorrigible!’. Samuel Alexander Papers, John 
Rylands University Library, manuscripts ALEX/A/1/1/260/1-2.
 For more on this, see Thomas (2013, 556-7).23
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reference to Zeno’s arrow in describing this problem, so we cannot be certain he has precisely the 
same problem in mind. 
 Sinclair believes that, if taken by itself, time would be discontinuous. Implicitly, she 
assumes that if we perceived time by itself, we would perceive that discontinuity. It is difficult to 
know what that would be like. Perhaps when we perceived an arrow in flight it would jerk or jump 
from one moment to the next. Of course, Sinclair does not believe we perceive time as 
discontinuous. Instead, she argues for (III), we perceive time as continuous. Sinclair points to 
bodies in motion:  
bodies do move through unmoving space in moving time; they do stand still in a moving time and 
unmoving space; and their movement is apparently continuous (Sinclair, 1922, 225). 
Imagine watching an arrow fly past a tree. The arrow moves from one part of space to another, over 
time. The tree does not move through space, yet it moves through time. The motion of the arrow 
and the tree through time seems to be continuous. Alexander (1920i, 39) also argues that time is 
experienced as ‘continuous’, ‘a duration of the successive’, its distinguishable parts ‘not isolated but 
connected’.  
 Sinclair may also have the psychology of her period in mind here. In her earlier work, 
Sinclair (1917, 294) refers to William James’ 1890 view that consciousness is given ‘in a 
continuous unity’. James (repr. 1910, 237) argues, ‘Within each personal consciousness, thought is 
sensibly continuous’. He defines ‘continuous’ as ‘that which is without breach, crack, or division’. 
Perhaps, if we could perceive discontinuous time, the experience would be the polar opposite of 
this: a consciousness exhibiting breaches, cracks or divisions . 24
  Incidentally, Sinclair was the first to use James’ stream of consciousness metaphor to describe a work of literature; 24
see Gillespie (1978). 
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 (II) claims time by itself would be discontinuous. (III) claims we perceive time as 
continuous. On Sinclair’s view, the only way to explain our perception of time as continuous is that 
we do not perceive time by itself. There must be must be something in addition to time, which leads 
us to perceive time as continuous. What might that extra ingredient be? An answer is found in the 
work of Alexander, who argues that the extra ingredient is space. Sinclair believes Alexander’s 
answer is the strongest of all realist answers, so if she can show it fails she will have shown (IV): 
realism cannot account for our perception of time as continuous. To explain Alexander’s account, 
and Sinclair’s attack on it, we must go deeper into the metaphysics.  
 Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity claims that space and time are the emergence base of all 
things. Alexander (1920ii, 45) argues when ‘motions’ or patterns within space and time become 
complex enough, new qualities emerge. In this fashion, matter emerges from space and time, 
followed by life, mind, and finally deity. Space and time are the foundation of Alexander’s 
metaphysics, and he describes how they would be if taken by themselves. As we saw above, he 
believes that, if we took time by itself, its moments would lack continuity. Alexander (1920i, 47) 
further claims that space taken by itself would be a mere ‘blank’, ‘a whole of co-existence’ with ‘no 
distinction of parts’.  
 Although Alexander claims that time by itself would be discontinuous, he believes we 
perceive time to be continuous. Similarly, although he claims that space by itself would lack parts, 
Alexander (1920i, 39) believes we perceive space to ‘contain distinguishable parts’. Why don’t his 
descriptions of time and space taken independently match our perceptual experience? Because, in 
reality, time and space are unified. On Alexander’s metaphysics, time and space provide each other 
with the features they individually lack: 
!14
Space and Time depend each upon the other, but for different reasons… Without Space there would 
be no connection in Time. Without Time there would be no points to connect... each of the two, 
Space and Time, is vital to the existence of other (Alexander, 1920i, 47-8). 
He believes space provides time with continuity, allowing the parts of time to connect and become a 
continuous successive duration. Space is continuously extended in length, breadth and depth, and 
space can lend its continuous extension to time. Just as space continuously connects different spatial 
places, space can continuously connect different moments of time. Meanwhile, time breaks up 
space into parts .  25
 Despite how impressed Sinclair is by Alexander’s system, she attacks it on several grounds, 
including its unification of space and time. She argues space does not provide time with continuity: 
For all its spaciousness Space cannot hold down more instants than one at a time. The past has 
gone from it, its grip on the future has not yet begun (Sinclair, 1922, 168). 
To understand this objection, remember that above I read Alexander as arguing that time by itself 
would lead to presentism. Yet Alexander is an eternalist. Alexander (1920i, 44) claims that ‘Physical 
Time’ is a succession from earlier to later. We can speak of past, present, and future in physical 
time, as long as we appreciate that the present is a moment of physical time ‘fixed by relation to an 
observing mind’. In physical time there is no presentness, points are merely earlier or later than one 
another . Thus, he seems to believe that time by itself leads to presentism, yet space and time 26
together leads to eternalism.  
 I read Sinclair as objecting that uniting space with time does not lead from presentism to 
eternalism. She is arguing that the ‘spaciousness’ or extension of space only covers the three 
 For more on space and time in Alexander’s metaphysics, see Thomas (2013).25
 Alexander (1920i, 63) compares his eternalist universe to a closed vessel containing gas, in which the gas molecules 26
dash about ‘in all manner of lines of advance’. We can choose any gas molecule to act as the ‘centre of reference’, to be 
the present moment. Its fellow molecules stand at various degrees of remoteness from this molecule, representing how 
near or far away they are in time, yet all are equally real. On Alexander’s eternalism, see Thomas (2017, §3). 
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dimensions of length, breadth and depth. Space cannot cover perishing ‘nows’, connecting past or 
future nows across the fourth dimension of time. On Alexander’s account of spacetime, space needs 
to provide continuity across time, and that is exactly what space cannot do. 
 Sinclair (1922, 168) also argues we should not accept Alexander’s claim that space taken by 
itself lacks parts. Alexander describes space taken by itself as a ‘a whole of co-existence’. She 
argues coexistence is a juxtaposition of coexisting points or parts, ‘and I cannot see how its points 
are to be conjured away from Space in the mere absence of Time’. As Sinclair (1922, 177) puts it a 
little later, space is ‘pure juxtaposition’: its points are already discriminated by their positions 
because they are positions.  
 In Sinclair’s view, the best realist account of why our perception of time is continuous has 
failed. This brings us to (V). If there is something in addition to time which leads us to perceive 
time as continuous, and that ‘something’ is not space, what is it? Sinclair argues it is consciousness. 
Through consciousness, the idealist can account for our perception of time as continuous. 
 Sinclair introduces her idealist solution with panache: 
in our perceptual experience… [bodies’] movement is apparently continuous… 
And the fact that this does actually happen in our perceptual experience should give us pause. Is it a 
naïf idealism that wonders whether, after all, perception may not have something to do with it? Not 
more naïf, I think, than the realism which assumes that you can subtract perception and everything 
will go on as before, or add it and it will make no difference.  
Only in unminded Space-Time, powerless to retain its own past and future, is there incurable 
disintegration. Introduce consciousness that joins instant to instant and holds past, present and future 
together in one duration… that links point with instant and point-instant with point-instant in one 
Space-Time; see Space-Time once for all as existing, not in and by and for itself, but as the simplest 
and most universal form of consciousness, so that all events happening in Space-Time are, ipso facto 
happening in consciousness, and contradiction disappears. Consciousness secures to events their 
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range in Space, their hold on Time, their past, their present and their future, in a word, their 
continuity (Sinclair, 1922, 225-6).   
Only consciousness can explain the continuity we perceive in time because only a consciousness 
can hold past and future together with the present in one moment. A conscious mind can remember 
the past and anticipate the future, overcoming the fact the present is a vanishing point between an 
unreal past and unreal future.  
 Consciousness can solve the puzzle Sinclair finds in Zeno’s arrow paradox, by providing the 
multiplicity of moments necessary for motion: 
In minded Space-Time motion becomes once more thinkable; bodies can and do move… [Zeno’s] 
arrow will fly (Sinclair, 1922, 226). 
Through memory, a mind can hold together the the past points of an arrow’s flight together with its 
present point, to perceive its motion.   
 To help us understand the process whereby consciousness can hold past, present and future 
together in one duration, I suggest we look to Henri Bergson’s 1889 Essai sur les données 
immédiates de la conscience, translated into English as Time and Free Will: An Essay on the 
Immediate Data of Consciousness. Bergson distinguishes two conceptions of time. ‘Mathematical 
time’ is spatialised, divisible into discrete, countable units. In contrast, ‘pure duration’ is utterly 
non-spatial. It is experienced by conscious beings, when our ego ‘lets itself live’. Pure duration does 
not divide up our moments of temporal experience, instead: 
[pure duration] forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we 
recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. Might it not be said that, even if 
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these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another (Bergson, trans. 1912, 
100-101).  
Sinclair was closely familiar with Time and Free Will (indeed, the fourth chapter of A Defence of 
Idealism is largely devoted to it, and translates large chunks from the original French). Although she 
does not reference Bergson in connection with our perception of continuous time, I believe this is 
the kind of process Sinclair has in mind. Consciousness can pull together the disconnected moments 
of time, forming past and present states into an organic whole. 
 To summarise, (I) claimed we should prefer a metaphysics that can account for our 
perception of time as continuous. (II) claims that time taken by itself would be discontinuous, yet 
(III) claims we perceive time as continuous. (IV) claims realism cannot account for our perception 
of time, and (V) claims idealism can. If the premises of Sinclair’s core argument go through, then so 
does her conclusion (VI): we should prefer an idealist metaphysics.  
4 Sinclair’s Pantheism   
4.1 Sinclair’s Absolute idealism and presentism 
 Sinclair is an Absolute idealist, and believes an Absolute consciousness underlies the world 
around us. Sinclair (1922, 296) identifies the Absolute with God, writing that she does not see how 
this ‘flight to God’ can be avoided.  
 Sinclair’s core argument could be read as arguing merely for the importance of human 
consciousness to explain our perception of time. You could then read her as going on to argue for 
the Absolute on independent grounds. For example, The New Idealism argues that Absolute 
idealism is better equipped to answer realist objections than idealisms that do not posit an Absolute 
(such as idealist monadologies). One objection is how an idealist system grounded on human 
consciousness can account for anything that existed before humans arrive. If you don’t posit an 
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Absolute, Sinclair (1922, 313) wryly observes, then dinosaurs ‘would be the sustainers of the 
universe of their time’. However, as I read Sinclair, an Absolute consciousness follows from her 
core argument. My reasoning is as follows. 
 Let’s return to Zeno’s paradox. Sinclair has solved the problem of the arrow: if t2 is the 
present moment of the arrow’s flight, human consciousness can involve its past t1 and its future t3 in 
that present, explaining why the arrow’s motion is perceived as continuous.  
 But Sinclair aims to go beyond arrows. I interpret her as positing continuous motions 
beyond what humans perceive. Each human consciousness is finite. Few humans have perceived 
much beyond the planet Earth, and no human perceived anything before we came into existence two 
million years ago. Yet Sinclair believes comets fly in distant galaxies, and dinosaurs walked the 
prehistoric Earth. As I read her, she reasons that there are continuous motions throughout the entire 
universe, so there must be a universe-wide consciousness perceiving those motions. This universe-
wide consciousness is the Absolute. This reading is supported by remarks already given above:  
see Space-Time… as the simplest and most universal form of consciousness, so that all events 
happening in Space-Time are, ipso facto happening in consciousness, and contradiction disappears. 
Consciousness secures to events… their continuity (Sinclair, 1922, 225-6).   
And by remarks such as this: 
  
The plesiosaurus will have disported himself on his mesozoic beach in God’s sight, though God had 
not the happy idea of evolving human minds to enjoy the spectacle of him. Before life was, the earth 
will have whirled, burned, cooled, upheaved and subsided in the Space-Time of God’s consciousness 
(Sinclair, 1922, 301). 
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I read Sinclair as making an argument from an analogy, moving from a finite human consciousness 
to an infinite Absolute consciousness.  
 A human consciousness is capable of considering a few past and future moments in any 
present moment. Yet an omniscient Absolute consciousness can consider every past and future 
moment in any future moment. Sinclair (1922, 246) describes a form of ‘ultimate consciousness’, 
on which ‘memory and anticipation are complete here and now, all space being known at an instant 
and all time at a point’. A human consciousness perceives the motion of an arrow to be continuous, 
and analogously the Absolute consciousness perceives all the motions of the universe to be 
continuous. 
 An interesting question for Sinclair is whether her completed system retains presentism. As 
we saw earlier, Alexander seems to believe that time taken by itself would produce a presentist 
universe, yet time taken with space leads to an eternalist one. Does Sinclair similarly believe that 
time taken with an Absolute mind, a mind that perceives all motions, results in an eternalist 
universe? She does not say explicitly but I argue her ultimate system is at least compatible with 
presentism.  
 Above, I quoted Sinclair as saying that a human consciousness can hold ‘past, present and 
future together in one duration’ (my emphasis). Say t2 is the present moment. Through memory, a 
human mind can involve a past moment t1 in the present. Through anticipation, a mind can also 
involve a future moment t3 in the present. Analogously, the Absolute consciousness can hold all past 
moments in the present through memory, and all future moments in the present through 
anticipation. Sinclair hints at how this process would work in her short story “Finding the 
Absolute” . This was first published in Sinclair’s 1923 Uncanny Stories, suggesting it may have 27
 Boll (1973, 303) and Glover (2001) provide short discussions of this story from a literary perspective. As far as I am 27
aware, this is the only scholarship on it.
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been written around the same time as The New Idealism. Although I am wary of reading too much 
into Sinclair’s fiction, the story seems highly relevant.  
 “Finding the Absolute” (repr. 2006) runs as follows. An Absolute pantheist named Mr 
Spalding dies and finds himself in heaven. Whilst there, Mr Spalding meets Kant, his philosophical 
hero, and the pair talk metaphysics in Kant’s study. Kant explains he has not solved all the riddles 
of the universe, remarking ‘The universe is a tremendous jigsaw puzzle. If God wanted to keep us 
amused to all eternity, he couldn’t have hit on anything better’. However, Kant does explain there is 
a kind of time which is not linear succession. It is a kind of time ‘which has turned on itself twice to 
take up the past and future into its present’. To show Mr Spalding how this works, Kant instructs 
him to look out the window at a cart moving along the street: 
What Mr Spalding saw was the sudden stoppage of the cart, which now appeared as standing 
simultaneously at each station…  
In the same duration of time, which was his present, he saw the townspeople moving in their houses, 
eating, smoking… 
The scene stretched and stretched, and still Mr Spalding kept before him each item as it had first 
appeared. He was now aware of the vast periods of geologic time. On the past side he saw the 
mammoth and the caveman; on the future he saw the Atlantic flooding the North Sea and 
submerging the flats of Lincolnshire… 
His stretch widened. He was present at the beginning and the end. He saw the earth flung off, like an 
incandescent ball, from the wheeling sun. He saw it hang like a dead white moon in a sky strewn 
with the corpses of dead worlds… The whole universe stood up on end round him, doubling all its 
future back upon all its past… 
And now the universe dissolved into the ultimate constituents of matter, electrons of electrons of 
electrons, an unseen web, intensely vibrating, stretched through all space and all time. He saw it 
sucked back into the space of space, the time of time, into the thought of God (Sinclair, repr. 2006, 
174-5). 
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Mr Spalding folds the past and the future into ‘the same duration of time, which was his present’. 
His knowledge of the past and the future has expanded to approach God’s, yet these memories and 
anticipations seem to be crammed into the present duration. This mental act, of involving past 
memories and future anticipations in the present moment, is compatible with presentism or 
eternalism. 
 Some evidence that Sinclair retains presentism can be found in one of her critiques of 
Alexander’s system: 
Take the total of Space-Time, Space-Time that was and is and is to be, and you will indeed have 
all Space covering all Time, and all Time covering all Space; but, if this mutual covering is to be 
conceived as a complete fit, Time must lose its time character of succession, it will be what Space 
is, an eternal “now” (Sinclair, 1922, 174).  
As I interpret Sinclair, she is objecting to the plausibility of Alexander’s four-dimensional, eternalist 
universe. She claims that if the past, present, and future exist, time would lose its character of 
‘succession’. By time’s character of succession, Sinclair seems to mean the way things appear to 
come in and out of existence in time. In this sense, one note of a tune is replaced or succeeded by 
the next note. On Alexander’s eternalist universe, all the notes of the tune exist simpliciter, spread 
out across real moments of time. The universe is a fixed block. I believe this is what Sinclair means 
by her description of Alexander’s universe as an eternal ‘now’, an eternal unchanging present. She 
is objecting that true succession requires things to come in and out of existence simpliciter. This is 
what happens on a presentist universe: one note of a tune exists at one time simpliciter. Things 
really come in and out of existence, and time retains its character of succession. If Sinclair believes 
time should retain succession in this sense, then presumably her universe is presentist.  
4.2 Pantheism and creation 
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 Sinclair (1922, 299) believes there is an Absolute consciousness, identified with God, and 
that reality is this Absolute. Her God has two aspects. There is an immanent aspect, which is our 
universe. There is also a transcendent aspect, which is beyond our universe. Sinclair (1922, 309) 
writes that the immanent aspect of God is God’s transcendent aspect made ‘manifest in Time’. This 
makes her a panentheist: the universe is ‘in’ God yet God is not exhausted by the universe. She 
hints that God manifests himself in this way because of his creative energy. For example, Sinclair 
(1922, 272-3) writes that the consciousness of God is not ‘merely contemplative’, it is also ‘creative 
and includes his Will, and the universe is the content and outcome of that creative consciousness’. 
As Sinclair makes clear here, to speak of ‘creation’ in this context is not to speak of God as creating 
things that are separate from him. Rather, we are speaking of creation in the sense that I create my 
thoughts. 
 She goes on to argue that space and time are forms of God’s thought: 
Spirit is the unity of Mind and Will. Space, as pure co-existence, expresses its Mind; Time, as 
consciousness, its Will. Therefore Mind and Will are as indivisible as their manifestation in Space-
Time, and like Space-Time, they are infinite in their being. The divided things, the divided selves, 
are finite, and this is their appearance, their existence. Their reality, their being, is the infinite and 
ultimate Self, which is God (Sinclair, 1922, 299).  
As I read this passage, Sinclair’s characterisation of space as ‘pure co-existence’ here refers to her 
earlier characterisation of space as a co-existence of parts. If space expresses a mind, then the mind 
must be a complex of many co-existing thoughts. Meanwhile, time is the will of God. Sinclair adds, 
‘The universe moves and pulses and has its being in the energy which are forms of God’s Will’. If 
the universe is continually changing over time, perhaps time is God’s will in the sense that these 
changed are willed by God.  
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 So, the universe is the mind of God, and space and time are God’s forms of thought. Why 
accord space and time this prominence? I argue the answer lies in Sinclair’s account of creation. 
Above, we saw that on Alexander’s metaphysics, all existents are generated out of space and time. 
As it stands, Sinclair argues Alexander’s spacetime metaphysics fails: 
Space-Time, empty of everything but point-instants, can generate nothing but more and more empty 
Space-Time; not even that without some creative energy behind it (Sinclair, 1922, 298). 
However, I believe Sinclair accepts space and time could be the crucible of all things, if there were 
some creative energy behind it. If space and time are the forms of thought of an Absolute being, 
then they can generate all things: 
If I may adopt Professor Alexander’s splendid phrases: The universe is begotten by Spirit out of 
Space-Time. Spirit spreads out the universe in its form of Space. In its form of Time it sweeps all 
things forward to change and generation (Sinclair, 1922, 299). 
A similar picture of creation is uncovered by Mr Spalding’s in “The Finding of the Absolute”: 
When he came out of his ecstasy he was aware that God was spinning his thought again, stretching 
the web of matter through space and time. 
He was going to make another jigsaw puzzle of a universe (Sinclair, repr. 2006, 176). 
Alexander and Sinclair agree that space and time are the foundation of our universe. They disagree 
over whether space and time are the bottommost layer. For Alexander, they are. For Sinclair, they 
are not: the Absolute lies one layer deeper still.  
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4.3 Sinclair’s account of omniscience   
 Sinclair spends some time considering problems for pantheism, and one of her responses to 
those problems is so original as to deserve special discussion. Sinclair (1922, 299-304) argues 
pantheism runs into two problems as soon as it tries to explain how God’s consciousness is 
correlated with ours. The ‘knowledge problem’ asks how much God knows of us. For example, 
Sinclair argues it is undesirable to say that my consciousness is God’s consciousness. If this were 
the case, all our errors, obscenities and stupidities would flourish in God’s mind. Or, if God’s 
consciousness was distinct from ours yet still minutely aware of our minds, God would be 
‘burdened with all our futilities and sillinesses and boredoms… the listener to millions and millions 
of idiotic conversations’. Although theists discuss various problems for God’s omniscience, 
including knowledge of the future, I am not aware that anyone has discussed this problem in 
particular . In addition, Sinclair’s ‘moral problem’ asks how God can be identified with all the 28
‘foolishness and badness’ of the universe. This is the pantheist version of the problem of evil. The 
traditional problem argues that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God 
is inconsistent with a world containing evil. The pantheist version argues it is inconsistent to 
identify God with a world containing evil. 
 Sinclair aims to tackle both problems in an extremely unusual way: by modifying God’s 
omniscience. Traditionally, theists maintain God is all knowing. (Even theists who believe God 
lacks knowledge of the future do not hold there are facts God does not know; instead, they usually 
deny there are facts about the future.) This is the source of the knowledge problem, as an 
omniscient God should know everything about each human consciousness. In response, Sinclair 
argues we should give up God’s omniscience:  
 Although Sinclair’s worry that God’s consciousness shouldn’t be identified with human errors, obscenities and 28
stupidities is related to arguments against omniscience from concept possession. As Nagasawa (2008, 37) explains, the 
worry is that God’s other attributes preclude him from fully understanding certain concepts, such as pain, fear, 
frustration and despair. 
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There was a hideous absurdity in the idea that God is vividly aware of our criminal lunacies and 
idiocies. But suppose he is not vividly aware? Suppose these things exist on a level which is far 
below the height of God’s transcendent consciousness, and that in this sense they are comparatively 
unreal? Suppose the universe to be literally the body of God, and that it contains our bodies as its 
parts, much as our bodies contain their cells and the life of the cells. Suppose God’s mind to contain 
our consciousness much as our minds contain the memories and instincts of the cells. Suppose the 
life of persons lowest in this scale of values to correspond in God’s consciousness with this organic 
cell life which we are hardly conscious of…  
On the other hand our spiritual states will be literally part of God’s living consciousness… He is 
joined with us consciously every time that we know reality, or create beauty, or will the good 
(Sinclair, 1922, 309). 
On Sinclair’s system, the morally ‘lowest’ lives are farthest from God’s consciousness, as remote to 
God as my blood cells are to me. Meanwhile, our ‘highest’ lives or states are within God’s 
consciousness, such that God shares in our creation of beauty or willed good. If our criminal 
lunacies are God’s blood cells, then our artworks and kindnesses are ideas in God’s mind. Once 
again, Sinclair is drawing an analogy between humans and God, this time to curb God’s knowledge.  
 Modifying God’s omniscience in this way also provides her with a response to the pantheist 
problem of evil. Sinclair (1922, 306-8) argues that God’s consciousness is the deepest level of 
reality. As God is unconscious of human foolishness and badness, that means there is no human 
foolishness and badness on the bottommost level. Those elements of the human experience are 
appearance, rather than reality. Sinclair’s denial of evil on the bottom level of reality belongs to a 
long tradition of denying the existence of evil, dating at least to Augustine’s characterisation of evil 
as a privation.  
 Sinclair’s modification of God’s omniscience is extremely unusual. Some theists are willing 
to modify God’s omnipotence or omnibenevolence in response to the problem of evil but I am not 
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aware of any willing to modify his omniscience in response . It might be thought especially 29
unusual from a pantheist perspective. Mander (2000, 200) argues it is an advantage of pantheism 
that divine error is impossible if God’s knowledge literally is the world. This identity thesis closes 
any possible gap between God’s knowledge and how things are in the world. In contrast, it is 
precisely this gap that Sinclair aims to crack open. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that Sinclair’s account of divine omniscience does not merely 
answer the problems she identifies for pantheism, it also underlies her account of the afterlife. Our 
spiritual states are part of God’s living consciousness, and this provides us with a form of 
immortality: 
our spiritual memories will endure in God’s consciousness; all that is immortal in us will be 
remembered there. God will literally be our keeper (Sinclair, 1922, 309). 
The idea that God will keep memories of us confirms my reading of Sinclair above as a presentist. 
The implication is that there will come a time where we do not exist simpliciter, yet God will retain 
memories of us.  
5 Conclusion 
 The culmination of Sinclair’s idealism is a pantheist Absolute. Yet, to my mind, the heart of 
The New Idealism lies in what I have labelled its ‘core argument’: its metaphysics of time. Sinclair 
sees the gravity of new realism’s opposition to idealism, and takes on their concern with time. She 
comes to believe that although the realist is right to worry about time, they cannot explain our 
experience of time as well as the idealist. If I am right that this is the heart of the book, it helps to 
explain what is and isn’t present inside its pages: Sinclair discusses realists such as Alexander and 
 Nagasawa (2013, §4) provides a useful overview of responses rejecting omnipotence and omnibenevolence.29
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Whitehead at length, because they do take time seriously; and she does not discuss idealists such as 
Bradley and McTaggart at length, because she believes they fail to take time seriously . Sinclair’s 30
idealism is new: it is not sourced in idealisms of old, rather it is built on new realist foundations. As 
an idealist, Sinclair’s decision to take time seriously is extremely unusual, and invites comparison 
with Oakeley, another rare woman idealist who defended realism about time . Sinclair’s twentieth 31
century idealism is both novel and creative .  32
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